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Abstract
The notion of transparency order, proposed by Prouff (DPA attacks and S-boxes, FSE 2005,
LNCS 3557, Springer, Berlin, 2005) and then redefined by Chakraborty et al. (Des Codes
Cryptogr 82:95–115, 2017), is a property that attempts to characterize the resilience of cryp-
tographic algorithms against differential power analysis attacks. In this paper, we give a tight
upper bound on the transparency order in terms of nonlinearity, inferring the worst possible
transparency order of those functions with the same nonlinearity. We also give a lower bound
between transparency order and nonlinearity. We study certain classes of Boolean functions
for their transparency order and find that this parameter for some functions of low algebraic
degree can be determined by their nonlinearity. Finally, we construct two infinite classes of
balanced semibent Boolean functions with provably relatively good transparency order (this
is the first time that an infinite class of highly nonlinear balanced functions with provably
good transparency order is given).
Keywords Transparency order · Boolean function · Nonlinearity
Mathematics Subject Classification 11T71 · 11L03
1 Introduction
Side-channel analysis (SCA) is a very powerful technique which targets implementations
of block ciphers [17]. Differential power analysis (DPA) [18] is a form of SCA, which
studies the power consumption of a cryptographic hardware device (it involves statistical
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analysis and error correction techniques to extract information correlated to secret keys,
which involves data collection by capturing power traces corresponding to some ciphertexts
and data analysis computing differential traces). DPA relies on the leakages from physical
hardware implementations, and is more efficient than the differential or linear cryptanalysis
[3,21]. To improve the resistance of a block cipher to DPA, some countermeasures have been
proposed, such as hiding and masking schemes [21]. However, those countermeasures are
extremely costly due to area overhead and throughput loss, and is therefore impractical for
resource constrained devices [26].
As the only nonlinear part in many ciphers, the S-box is fundamental for the security of
the cipher, and its cryptographic properties should be good. For assessing the behavior of
an S-box against SCA, several properties were proposed. First property related with SCA
was introduced in 2004, called SNR (Signal-to-Noise Ratio) DPA [14]. In 2005, Prouff
[32] proposed the notion of transparency order which characterizes the resistance of an S-
box to DPA attacks. Later, Fei [10,11] introduced the notion of confusion coefficient. Very
recently, Chakraborty et al. [7] found that the original definition had flaws and redefined
the transparency order (a low transparency order is desired). They confirmed practically that
the revised transparency order has impact on the resistance of the implementation against
DPA attacks. The challenge is that highly nonlinear S-boxes have higher transparency order
(not desired), implying that they are more susceptible to DPA attacks, while linear S-boxes
are good in terms of transparency order but cannot be used for other cryptographic reasons.
It should be noted that the revised transparency order is still inadequate to gauge the side
channel robustness, but gives an indication. However, though it does not rule out DPA, a
proper choice of the transparency order can lead to less overheads in the countermeasures,
such as masking, as shown in Sect. 6 of [26].
DPA is also a real threat for stream ciphers. In 2006, Fischer et al. [13] made use of the
nonlinear part of Grain and presented a DPA attack on this cipher. The nonlinear combiner
and the filter generator are two well studied models of stream cipher [6]. In these two mod-
els, the Boolean function is the only nonlinear part and should have good cryptographic
properties: balancedness, high algebraic degree, high algebraic immunity, high nonlinearity,
correlation immunity and good immunity to fast algebraic attacks. Moreover, it should have
good resistance to DPA attacks. If the other cryptographic properties of two functions are
equivalent, then a designer can choose the function with a better transparency order.
1.1 Related work
As already pointed out, a low transparency order of an S-box is considered to be good. In
the same year when this notion was proposed, Carlet [3] showed that some highly nonlinear
S-boxes constructed using power maps have very bad transparency orders. However, it seems
that this new notion did not receive enough attention until 2013. Since then, many papers
revisited this topic (see e.g. [9,22–25,28–31,34,35]), and constructed some 4 × 4 and 8 × 8
S-boxes with relatively good transparency orders using search algorithms.
The transparency order ofBoolean functionswas firstly considered by Picek et al. [27], and
some 8-variable Boolean functions with good nonlinearity and relatively good transparency
order were found using evolutionary algorithms. In 2015, using similar evolutionary algo-
rithms, Jain and Chaudhari [16] found three 8-variable highly nonlinear balanced Boolean
functions that have lower transparency orders than the ones of [27].
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So far, little attempt has been made to analyze theoretically the transparency order, and
all constructions related to the transparency order are based on search algorithms and with
only up to 8 variables.
1.2 Our contribution
In this paper, we give a tight upper bound on transparency order in terms of nonlinearity,
inferring the worst possible transparency order of those functions with the same nonlinearity.
We also give a lower bound between transparency order and nonlinearity. We study certain
classes of Boolean functions for their transparency order and find that this parameter for
some functions of low algebraic degree can be determined by their nonlinearity. From the
above results, for most cases, the transparency order will increase as the value of nonlinearity
increases. In other words, the transparency order and nonlinearity cannot be both good in
the same time. However, given some nonlinearity, we can choose a function with relative
good transparency order, given the unavoidable trade-off. Finally, we construct two infinite
classes of balanced semibent Boolean functions with provably relatively good transparency
order (this is the first time that an infinite class of highly nonlinear balanced functions with
provably good transparency order is given).
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, the necessary background is established.
In Sect. 3, we deduce the upper and lower bounds on the transparency order in terms of the
nonlinearity. In Sect. 4, we prove that the transparency order of some functions with low
degree can be determined by their nonlinearity and then give some experimental results on
the transparency order of some cryptographic Boolean functions in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6, we
investigate how the transparency order behaves on concatenations. In Sect. 7, we construct
two infinite classes of balanced semibent Boolean functions with provably relatively good
transparency order. We end in Sect. 8 with conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
Let Fn2 be the n-dimensional vector space over the finite field F2. We denote by Bn the set
of all n-variable Boolean functions, from Fn2 into F2. Any Boolean function f ∈ Bn can be
uniquely represented as a multivariate polynomial in F2[x1, . . . , xn],







which is called the algebraic normal form (ANF) of f . The algebraic degree of f , denoted
by deg( f ), is the number of variables in the highest order term with nonzero coefficient. A
Boolean function is affine if there exists no term of degree strictly greater than 1 in the ANF.
The set of all affine functions is denoted by An .
Let 1 f = {x ∈ Fn2 | f (x) = 1} be the support of a Boolean function f , whose cardinality
|1 f | is called the Hamming weight of f , and will be denoted by wt( f ). The Hamming
distance between two functions f and g, denoted by d( f , g), is the Hamming weight of
f + g. We say that an n-variable Boolean function f is balanced if wt( f ) = 2n−1. Let
f ∈ Bn . The nonlinearity [4,8] of f is
nl( f ) = min
g∈An
d( f , g).
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The nonlinearity of an n-variable Boolean function is bounded above by 2n−1 − 2n/2−1, and
a function is said to be bent if it achieves this bound.
TheWalsh–Hadamard transform of a given function f ∈ Bn is the integer-valued function
over Fn2 defined by
W f (ω) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1) f (x)+ω·x ,
where ω ∈ Fn2 and ω · x is an inner product, for instance, ω · x = ω1x1+ω2x2+ · · ·+ωnxn .
It is easy to see that a Boolean function f is balanced if and only if W f (0) = 0. Moreover,
the nonlinearity of f can be determined by





Let F = (F1, . . . , Fm), Fi ∈ Bn , be a vectorial function from Fn2 to Fm2 . The transparency
order [7] of F is defined by





















is the correlation between Fi , Fj (if Fi = Fj , we shall use the notation CFi and call it the
autocorrelation of Fi ). If m = 1, then F is a Boolean function, and










Clearly, T O(F) is affine invariant [7]. It is noted that the revised transparency order and the
original transparency order are the same for Boolean functions [32].
Further, recall that f ∈ Bn is called plateaued if |W f (u)| ∈ {0, 2(n+s)/2} for all u ∈ Fn2
for a fixed integer s depending on f (we also then call f s-plateaued). If s = 1 (n must then
be odd), or s = 2 (n must then be even), we call f semibent.
We use || to denote the concatenation, i.e., ( f1|| f2)(x1, . . . , xn, xn+1) = f1(x1, . . . , xn)⊕
xn+1( f1(x1, . . . , xn) ⊕ f2(x1, . . . , xn)).
The following two lemmaswill be used afterwards, and are direct consequences of Poisson
summation formula (see e.g. [4]).
Lemma 2.1 Let f ∈ Bn. Then for any y ∈ Fn2 ,
∑
x∈Fn2










(−1) f (x)⊕ f (x⊕y)⊕v·y = W2f (v).
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3 Transparency order and nonlinearity
3.1 An upper bound of the transparency order
It was observed in [7] that linear functions have the lowest transparency order and high
nonlinear functions tend to have worse transparency order. The question that arises is to find
some connection between transparency order and nonlinearity. In our next result, we give an
upper bound for the transparency order in terms of nonlinearity, inferring the worst possible
transparency order of those functions with the same nonlinearity.
Theorem 3.1 Let f ∈ Bn. Then
T O( f ) ≤ 1 − (2
n − 2nl( f ))2
2n(2n − 1) +
1
2n − 1 .























(−1) f (x)⊕ f (x⊕y)⊕v·y − 2n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
.






(−1) f (x)⊕ f (x⊕y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣











W2f (v) − 2n = (2n − 2nl( f ))2 − 2n,
and the result follows. ⊓*
Wenowshow that the upper boundofTheorem3.1 is tight.Wedefine theWalsh–Hadamard




Theorem 3.2 Let f ∈ Bn. If nl( f ) ≤ 2n−1 − 2n−
3
2 or nl( f ) = 2n−1 − 2 n2 −1, then
T O( f ) = 1 − (2
n − 2nl( f ))2
2n(2n − 1) +
1
2n − 1 .
If f is s-plateaued, then
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Proof If nl( f ) ≤ 2n−1 − 2n− 32 , then we have
max
ω∈Fn2
|W f (ω)| ≥ 2n−
1
2 .




f (u) = 22n , we have















(−1)(u⊕v)·yW2f (u) ≥ 0.




(−1) f (x)⊕ f (x⊕y) = 0.























(−1) f (x)⊕ f (x⊕y)
= W2f (v) − 2n =
(
2n − 2nl( f )
)2 − 2n,
and the first claim follows.
Next, if f is s-plateaued, using Lemma 2.1 and the fact that the cardinality
#
{




= ## f = 2n−s , we get







(−1) f (x)⊕ f (x⊕y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
























and the proof of the theorem is done. ⊓*
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3.2 A lower bound of the transparency order
We now give a lower bound for the transparency order.
Theorem 3.3 Let f ∈ Bn and nl( f ) ≥ 2n−1 −C · 2
n
2 ≥ 0, where C > 0 is a constant. Then
T O( f ) ≥ 1 −
√
16C4 − 1√
2n − 1 .
Clearly, T O( f ) → 1, if n → ∞.












































































≤ (2n − 1)(16C4 − 1)22n,
and the result follows. ⊓*




2n − 1 ≤ T O( f ) ≤ 1 −
2s − 1
2n − 1 .
Proof By taking C = 2 s2−1 in the theorem above, we obtain the lower bound. Since nl( f ) =
2n−1 − 2 n+s2 −1, the upper bound follows from Theorem 3.1. ⊓*
Wenote that if n is large and the nonlinearity of f is high, then the lower bound of Theorem3.3
shows that T O( f ) is not good. In other words, transparency order and nonlinearity of a
Boolean function cannot be both good.
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Table 1 Comparison among 5-variable functions
nl( f ) Exact value of T O( f ) Upper bound Lower bound
0 0 0 0
1 0.1250 0.1250 0
2 0.2419 0.2419 0
3 0.3508 0.3508 0
4 0.4516 0.4516 0
5 0.5444 0.5444 0
6 0.6290 0.6290 0
7 0.7056 0.7056 0
8 0.7742 0.7742 0
9 0.7540 ≤ T f ≤ 0.8105 0.8347 0
10 0.7258 ≤ T f ≤ 0.8871 0.8871 0.2120
11 0.8266 ≤ T f ≤ 0.8508 0.9315 0.4682
12 0.9677 or 0.9355 0.9677 0.6889
3.3 Some numerical experiments
For n = 5, the classification of Boolean functions under the affine group has been fully
studied (see [19,20]). We computed nl( fi ) and T O( fi ) for representatives of all those affine
equivalence classes and summarize the results in Table 1. From this table we see that if
nl( fi ) ≤ 8, then T O( fi ) equals our upper bound. Moreover, for 0 ≤ m ≤ 6, there exists fi
of nonlinearity 2m such that T O( fi ) achieves our upper bound.
In Table 1, we also give the lower bound of T O( f ), for n = 5. From the table, if
nl( f ) = 12, then we have T O( f ) ≥ 0.689. But the exact value of T O( f ) is either 0.968 or
0.936. There seems to be a big gap between the lower bound and the exact value of T O( f ).
For n = 6, there are 15,768,919 affine equivalence classes [15], and it is impractical to
compute nl( fi ) and T O( fi ) for representatives of all these affine equivalence classes. We
made some numerical experiments and it seems that the following conjecture holds.




T O(g) = 1 − (2
n − 2nl( f ))2
2n(2n − 1) +
1
2n − 1 .
4 Transparency order of some Boolean functions with low degree
We now show that the transparency order of some low algebraic degree functions attains the
bound given by Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.1 The following functions all achieve the upper bound of Theorem 3.1:
(i) If f ∈ Bn be a quadratic function, then
T O( f ) = 1 − (2
n − 2nl( f ))2
2n(2n − 1) +
1
2n − 1 .
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(ii) If f ∈ Bn is any cubic symmetric f = s3 + λ2s2 + λ1s1, where si are the elementary
symmetric polynomials of degree i , and λi ∈ F2, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, then
T O( f ) = 1 − (2
n − 2nl( f ))2
2n(2n − 1) +
1
2n − 1 .
(iii) If f ∈ Bn is the elementary symmetric polynomials of degree 4, where n ≡ 1 (mod 4),
then
T O( f ) = 1 − (2
n − 2nl( f ))2
2n(2n − 1) +
1
2n − 1 .
Proof When f is quadratic, it is well known that f is affine equivalent to a function of the
form f1 = x1x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x2p−1x2p or f2 = x1x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x2q−1x2q ⊕ x2q+1, where p ≤ n2
and q ≤ n−12 . Clearly, nl( f1) = (22p−1 − 2p−1)2n−2p and nl( f2) = (22q−1 − 2q−1)2n−2q .






















1≤i≤2q(yi ⊕ 1) = 1,
0, otherwise,
Therefore,
T O( f2) = 1 −
1
2n(2n − 1)2
n(2n−2q − 1) = 1 − 2
n−2q − 1
2n − 1 .
If n > 2p, then
T O( f1) = 1 −
1
2n(2n − 1)2
n(2n−2p − 1) = 1 − 2
n−2p − 1
2n − 1 ,
and the first claim follows.
Next, if f is any cubic symmetric, then from TABLE III of [2], C f (y) ≥ 0, when wt(y)
is even. Moreover, C f (y) is a constant, if wt(y) is odd. Therefore, there is a v = (0, . . . , 0)
or (1, . . . , 1) such that
∑
y∈Fn∗2




Then by Lemma 2.2,
T O( f ) = 1 −
W2f (v) − 2n
2n(2n − 1) ≥ 1 −
(2n − 2nl( f ))2
2n(2n − 1) +
1
2n − 1 .
Hence, by Theorem 3.1, the second claim follows.
We now show the last claim. It is easy to check that
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1) f (x)⊕ f (x⊕y) > 0,
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Table 2 Transparency order of
the majority function
n nl The upper bound TO(MF)
5 10 0.8871 0.7258
6 22 0.9167 0.8333
7 44 0.9094 0.8268
8 93 0.9289 0.8042
9 186 0.9270 0.8027
10 386 0.9404 0.8538
11 772 0.9399 0.8534
12 1586 0.9493 0.8422
for any y ∈ Fn2. Therefore, by Lemma 2.2,
∑
y∈Fn∗2
|C f (y)| =
∑
y∈Fn2
(−1)0·yC f (y) − 2n = W2f (0) − 2n .
Hence,
T O( f ) = 1 −
W2f (0) − 2n
2n(2n − 1)
≥ 1 − (2
n − 2nl( f ))2
2n(2n − 1) +
1
2n − 1 ,
and the last claim follows. ⊓*
It should be noted that there aremany cubic functions whose transparency orders are lower
than the upper bound. For example, x1x2x5 ⊕ x1x3x4 ⊕ x2x3 is a 5-variable function with
the nonlinearity 10. Its transparency order is 0.823, while the upper bound is 0.887.
If n ≡ 1 (mod 4), then the transparency order of the n-variable elementary symmetric
polynomials of degree 4 is the same as the upper bound. For other cases, its transparency
order may be good. For example, if n = 6 or 7, then the elementary symmetric polynomials
of degree 4 is the majority function, and its transparency order is much lower than the upper
bound given by Theorem 3.1.
5 Experimental results on the transparency order of some
cryptographic Boolean functions
We now present some experimental results related to the transparency order of some Boolean
functions.
The majority function Let MF ∈ Bn be the majority function. That is, MF(x) = 1 if and
only if wt(x) > n2 . We computed the transparency order of the majority function, for 5 ≤
n ≤ 12 and compare it with the upper bound given by Theorem 3.1 (see Table 2). For n = 5,
the majority function has the lowest transparency order among all those functions with the
nonlinearity 10. Forn > 5,wedonot knowwhether it still can achieve the lowest transparency
order. But it seems that the transparency order ofMF is also quite good compared to functions
with the same nonlinearity.
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Table 3 Transparency order of
the hidden weighted bit function
n nl The upper bound TO(HWBF)
5 10 0.8871 0.8387
6 20 0.8730 0.8492
7 44 0.9094 0.8720
8 88 0.9059 0.8814
9 186 0.9270 0.8977
10 372 0.9261 0.9052
11 772 0.9399 0.9156
12 1544 0.9397 0.9202
Table 4 Transparency order of
the Carlet–Feng function
n nl The upper bound TO(CF)
5 10 0.8871 0.8710
6 24 0.9524 0.9048
7 54 0.9833 0.9380
8 112 0.9882 0.9564
9 232 0.9932 0.9691
10 484 0.9980 0.9823
11 984 0.9990 0.9866
12 1994 0.9995 0.9922




0 if x = 0
xwt(x) otherwise.
It is known that HWBF can be implemented very efficiently and has acceptable cryp-
tographic properties. We computed the transparency order of HWBF , for 5 ≤ n ≤ 12
and compare it with the upper bound given by Theorem 3.1 (see Table 3). Comparing
with the majority function, T O(HWBF) is weaker, since nl(HWBF) ≤ nl(MF) and
T O(HWBF) is much higher than T O(MF).




0, 1,α,α2, . . . ,α2
n−1−2},
where α ∈ F2n is a primitive element. It is known that CF has quite good cryptographic
properties andmany functions based on it have been constructed [33,38–41,43].We computed
the transparency order of the Carlet–Feng function CF ∈ Bn [5], for 5 ≤ n ≤ 12 and
compared it with the upper bound given by Theorem 3.1 (see Table 4).
Rotation symmetric Boolean functions (RSBFs) We tested the transparency order for
(7, 2, 4, 56) RSBFs. It is shown in [36] that there are 36 such functions with f (0) = 0. For
these functions, T O( f ) = 1 − 8127 = 0.937, while the upper bound given by Theorem 3.1
is 0.992. It seems that the transparency order of such RSBFs is quite good compared to
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functions with the same nonlinearity. The number of (8, 1, 6, 116) RSBFs with f (0) = 0 is
precisely 10272. The truth table of an (8, 1, 6, 116) RSBF is given in [37] as follows
005562677d592d7a3be632c34da23bcc
0 f 8b f d3c5a49b05a31 f 6c94c5e9ae4a0,
which has quite a good transparency order, namely T O( f ) = 0.9618. We recall that the
lowest transparency order of balanced functions with the nonlinearity 116 found by [27]
using the evolutionary computation methods is 0.962.
6 Transparency order and concatenations
There are quite a few constructions of functions with good cryptographic properties, which
are concatenations of functions on fewer number of variables (more often than not, even
affine functions). Consequently, we want to investigate how the transparency order of f
compares with the transparency order of its components. To that effect, let f ∈ Bn+1 and
write f (x, xn+1) = f1(x)|| f2(x), where f2 := f1 or f2 := f̄1 = f1 ⊕ 1.
Theorem 6.1 Let f1, f2 ∈ Bn and f (x, xn+1) = f1(x)|| f2(x). If f2 := f1 or f2 := f̄1, then
T O( f ) = 2
n+1 − 2
2n+1 − 1 T O( f1).
In general,
T O( f ) = 1 − 2
2n+1(2n+1 − 1)
⎛







Proof We shall show both claims at once, pointing out where we require f2 = f1, f2 = f̄1.
We first concentrate on the autocorrelation of f at (y, yn+1)
C f (y, yn+1) =
∑
(x,xn+1)∈Fn+12








(−1) f2(x)⊕yn+1 f1(x⊕y)⊕ȳn+1 f2(x⊕y).
If yn+1 = 0, then
C f (y, 0) =
∑
x∈Fn2







(−1) f1(x)⊕ f1(x⊕y) = 2 C f1(y), if f2 = f1 or f2 = f̄1.
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If yn+1 = 1, then
C f (y, 1) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1) f1(x)⊕ f2(x⊕y) +
∑
x∈Fn2




(−1) f1(x)⊕ f1(x⊕y) = 2ϵ C f1(y), if f2 = f1, f2 = f̄1,
where ϵ = −1 when yn+1 = 1 and f2 = f̄1, and ϵ = 1, otherwise.





2n(2n − 1) (1 − T O( f1)), we obtain




∣∣C f (y, yn+1)
∣∣



























⎠ , if f2 = f1, f2 = f̄1
= 1 − 2
2n+1(2n+1 − 1)
(




2n+1 − 1 T O( f1),
and both claims of the theorem are shown. ⊓*
7 Constructions of balanced semibent Boolean functions with provably
relatively good transparency order
In this section, wewill construct two infinite classes of n-variable balanced semibent Boolean
functions with relatively good transparency order, where n is odd. The 5-variable function
of the first class has the lowest transparency order among those 5-variable functions with the
maximum nonlinearity 12. For n ≥ 9, the n-variable function of the second class has lower
transparency order than that of the first class.
Lemma 7.1 Let f = b1||b2, where b1, b2 ∈ Bn−1 are two bent functions. Then f is semibent
and
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Proof It is well known that the concatenation of two bent functions is semibent. Let y =
(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Fn∗2 . If yn = 0, then
∑
x∈Fn2







where ŷ = (y1, . . . , yn−1). If yn = 1, then
∑
x∈Fn2











and the result follows. ⊓*
Theorem 7.2 Let F1(x) = x1x2xn ⊕ x1x3xn ⊕ x2x4xn ⊕ x3x4xn ⊕ x1x2 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ · · · ⊕
xn−2xn−1 ⊕ xn, where n ≥ 5 is odd. Then F1 is a balanced semibent function and
T O(F1) = 1 −
2
2n − 1 .
Proof Clearly, F1 = b3||b4, where b3(x) = x1x2 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn−2xn−1 and
b4(x) = x1x3 ⊕ x2x4 ⊕ x5x6 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn−2xn−1 ⊕ 1 are bent functions and wt(b3) +
wt(b4) = 2n−1. Therefore, F1 is a balanced semibent function. Let y = (y1, . . . , yn−1) ∈
Fn−12 . If there exists an i > 4 such that yi = 1, then b3(x) ⊕ b4(x ⊕ y) =
xi−(−1)i ⊕ h(x1, . . . , xi−(−1)i−1, xi−(−1)i+1, . . . , xn−1) is balanced, where h ∈ Bn−2.
Now we consider the case y = (y1, y2, y3, y4, 0, . . . , 0). It is easy to check that
b3(x) ⊕ b4(x ⊕ y) is not balanced only when (y1, y2, y3, y4) ∈ Y , where Y =
{(0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1, 1)}. Moreover, if (y1, y2, y3, y4) ∈ Y , then
x1x2 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ (x1 ⊕ y1)(x3 ⊕ y3)⊕ (x2 ⊕ y2)(x4 ⊕ y4) ∈ B4 is of weight 4 or 12. Therefore,
by Lemma 7.1, we have




















= 1 − 2
n−5
2n−1(2n − 1) · 4 · 8
= 1 − 2
2n − 1 ,
and the theorem is shown. ⊓*
Remark 7.3 ByLemma 7.1, the highest transparency order of an n-variable semibent function
is 1 − 12n−1 . F1 is a balanced semibent function with transparency order 1 − 22n−1 . Taking
n = 5, we have F1(x) = x1x2x5⊕x1x3x5⊕x2x4x5⊕x3x4x5⊕x1x2⊕x3x4⊕x5, nl(F1) = 12
and T O(F1) = 0.936. From Table 1, F1 has the lowest transparency order among those 5-
variable Boolean functions with the nonlinearity 12. For general n, we do not know the lowest
transparency order of n-variable semibent functions, which we leave as an open problem.
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Theorem 7.4 Let F2(x) = (x1x2 ⊕ x1x8 ⊕ x2x7 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ x3x6 ⊕ x4x5 ⊕ x5x6 ⊕ x7x8)xn ⊕
x1x2 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn−2xn−1 ⊕ xn, where n ≥ 9 is odd. Then F2 is a balanced semibent
function and
T O(F2) = 1 −
4
2n − 1 .
Proof Clearly, F2 = b5||b6,whereb5(x) = x1x2⊕x3x4⊕· · ·⊕xn−2xn−1 andb6(x) = x1x8⊕
x2x7⊕x3x6⊕x4x5⊕x9x10 · · ·⊕xn−2xn−1⊕1 are bent functions andwt(b5)+wt(b6) = 2n−1.
Therefore, F2 is a balanced semibent function. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7.2, we have











where b7(x) = x1x2 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ x5x6 ⊕ x7x8 and b8(x) = x1x8 ⊕ x2x7 ⊕ x3x6 ⊕ x4x5.
Therefore,
T O(F2) = 1 −
2n−9
2n−1(2n − 1) · 16 · 64,
and the result follows. ⊓*
Taking n = 9, we have nl(F2) = 240 and T O(F2) = 0.992. A natural question is whether
F2 has the lowest transparency order among those 9-variable balanced semibent functions.
The answer is negative which can be seen from the following example.
Example 7.5 Let F3 = b9||b10, where b9, b10 ∈ B8, the truth table of b9 is
555533330F0F00FF66665A5A55AA3C3C
33CC0FF0696966995AA53CC369960000
and the truth table of b10 is
BBF0BBC3AAB4994B883C880F66875578
FCA93065B7B7847BFC56309A847BB7B7.
It is easy to check that b9, b10 are two Maiorana-McFarland functions [4,8] with degree 4,
and F3 is a balanced semibent function of degree 5. We have T O(F3) = 0.9745, which is
lower than that of F2.
Remark 7.6 It is still an open problem whether there exist 8-variable balanced functions
with nonlinearity 118. For 8-variable balanced functions with nonlinearity 116, using search
algorithms, the lowest transparency order has been found is 0.958 [16]. Up until now, there
exists no result on the transparency order of 9-variable Boolean functions. Example 7.5
provides a 9-variable balanced function with nonlinearity 240 and transparency order 0.9745.
This value seems quite good, and it may be challenging to find 9-variable balanced functions
with nonlinearity 240 and lower transparency order using search algorithms.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we give some bounds between transparency order and nonlinearity, inferring
the worst possible transparency order of those functions with the same nonlinearity. We
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study certain classes of Boolean functions for their transparency order and find that the
transparency order of some functionswith lowdegree can be determined by their nonlinearity.
Furthermore, we construct two infinite classes of balanced semibent Boolean functions with
provably relatively good transparency order.
The field is still open and there are many problems deserving to be studied. To be specific,
given some value of the nonlinearity, what is the minimum value of the transparency order?
How do we construct highly nonlinear balanced functions with the minimum transparency
order? The transparency order is a criterion for designing cryptographic algorithms to resist
DPA attacks. We hope that our work would attract more researchers to be interested in this
new and interesting notion.
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